In Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey (A-11-23/087994) (Decided July 24, 2024), the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed that the ministerial exception barred defamation claims against an Orthodox Jewish school. The six justices that heard the case all agreed that the standard set forth in McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 51 (2002), applied in the case. However, they were evenly divided as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to discovery. The 3-3 split allowed the Appellate Division’s dismissal to stand.
Facts of Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey
Plaintiff Shlomo Hyman was employed as a Judaic Studies teacher by defendant Rosenbaum Yeshiva of New Jersey, an Orthodox Jewish school. In 2019, after investigating claims of misconduct and consulting with legal counsel and authorities on Jewish law, Rosenbaum Yeshiva terminated Hyman’s employment. In a letter, the Head of School advised parents and faculty members that the Yeshiva took that action because it deemed Hyman’s conduct “neither acceptable nor consistent with how a rebbe in our Yeshiva should interact with students.”
Hyman and six members of his family filed suit against Rosenbaum Yeshiva and three of its leaders. Hyman asserted individual claims for age discrimination and defamation. After discovery, which was limited to the question whether Hyman qualified as a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment during his employment at the Yeshiva, he conceded that he was a minister and abandoned his age discrimination claim.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. It reasoned that if the claims were allowed to proceed to trial, they would entangle the court in matters of religious doctrine, thus violating the First Amendment. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the ministerial exception applied only to Hyman’s age discrimination claim and that he could prove defamation under legal principles that would not implicate the First Amendment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. It held that the ministerial exception bars tort claims if they are asserted by a party who constitutes a minister for purposes of the exception and the claims are “related to the religious institution’s employment decision.” According to the Appellate Division, the defamation claims in this case met that test.
NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in Hyman v. Rosenbaum Yeshiva of North Jersey
The six members of the Court who participated in the appeal unanimously agreed that the standard set forth in in McKelvey v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26, 51 (2002), applied in the case. The Court readopted that standard, with two refinements to accord with recent United States Supreme Court precedent. Because the justices were equally divided as to whether discovery is required in the case, the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on summary judgment without discovery, is affirmed.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s per curium opinion first addressed the standard set forth in McKelvey, under which a court must analyze each element of a challenged tort claim and determine whether the court’s adjudication of that claim would require it to “choose between competing religious visions, or cause interference with a church’s administrative prerogatives, including its core right to select, and govern the duties of, its ministers.” If adjudication raises no such First Amendment concerns, the court may decide the claim; if not, it must dismiss it.
The Court concluded that McKelvey remains good law, with some modifications required to comply with recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent. First, the Court clarified that the ministerial exception is clearly not limited to employment decisions made by religious institutions on religious grounds. Second, the Court declined to readopt language suggesting that a minister’s claim for damages in the employment discrimination setting does not implicate the First Amendment.
Applying that standard to Hyman’s defamation claims, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a court’s determination of each element of those claims would mandate an inquiry into the religious tenets that govern Rosenbaum Yeshiva and would interfere with the Yeshiva’s right to choose and supervise its ministers. However, the Court divided 3-3 regarding whether the Appellate Division should have affirmed the dismissal of Hyman’s defamation claims given that only limited discovery was conducted before applying McKelvey’s First Amendment protections. Accordingly, the Appellate Division was affirmed.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Anne M. Patterson argued that reversing the Appellate Division’s decision “would mandate an inquiry into the religious tenets that govern Rosenbaum Yeshiva and would interfere with the Yeshiva’s right to choose and supervise its ministers.” Justices Lee A. Solomon and Douglas M. Fasciale joined the concurrence.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Fabiana Pierre-Louis maintained that that plaintiffs are entitled to full discovery in any defamation case before McKelvey can be applied. “Under the concurring opinion’s analysis, a religious entity can seemingly fire an employee based solely on a personal vendetta, publish a knowingly false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, and shield itself from liability — and even discovery — by invoking the ministerial exception,” he wrote. “Such a holding slams the courthouse door shut on potentially wronged plaintiffs before they can even obtain discovery that would allow a court to determine whether adjudicating their claims actually interferes with religious autonomy.” His dissent was joined Chief Justice Stuart Rabner and Justice Michael Noriega.