In C.R. v. M.T. (A-47-22/087887) (Decided April 22, 2024), the Supreme Court of New Jersey clarified the showing required to obtain a final protective order under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015 (SASPA).
According to the Court, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2)r creates a standard that is “permissive and easily satisfied,” which was met by the plaintiff’s testimony that the sexual assault “destroyed” her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was “terrified” for her safety.
Facts of C.R. v. M.T.
Plaintiff “Clara” testified that, in June 2018, she was sexually assaulted by defendant “Martin.” Clara applied for a temporary protective order (TPO), and then a final protective order (FPO), under SASPA.
The statute directs that in determining whether to issue a final protective order, “the court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors: (1) the occurrence of one or more acts of nonconsensual sexual contact [or] sexual penetration . . . against the alleged victim; and (2) the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim.”
After hearing testimony, the trial court found that (1) Clara had been “subjected to nonconsensual sexual contact within the meaning of SASPA” because her “extreme voluntary intoxication” made it impossible for her to consent to sexual contact; and (2) there was a possibility of future risk to Clara’s safety or well-being because Martin had been subjected to legal fees defending against the SASPA FPO and “may now harbor a grudge against [Clara] which would probably not have occurred but for these proceedings.” The court therefore issued an FPO directing Martin to have no contact with Clara.
The Appellate Division reversed on the basis of the test the trial court had used to assess consent under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1). The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the affirmative consent standard . . . is the correct standard to be applied in determining whether sexual activity” was consensual under SASPA. 248 N.J. 428, 431, 445 (2021).
On remand, Clara testified that she continued, more than three years later, to be intensely traumatized by the sexual assault. Martin did not testify, electing to rely on his testimony from the initial hearing. The court found Clara’s testimony from the first and second hearings “credible and believable” and Martin’s testimony from the first hearing “not credible” and “not truthful.” On the first factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1), the court therefore held that consent to sexual contact “was not affirmatively and freely given.” With regard to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), the court noted that “the statute only requires a possibility, as opposed to a probability.” The court found “a significant risk to [Clara’s] psychological well-being should this order not remain in effect” and ordered the FPO previously issued to remain in effect.
The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that “plaintiff satisfied her burden of demonstrating a predicate act as defined under” N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(1) and that “there exists a possibility of future risk to her safety or well-being as required by” the ordinary terms of -16(a)(2).
NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in C.R. v. M.T.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. “We hold that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2) creates a standard that is permissive and easily satisfied. Here, plaintiff testified that a sexual assault ‘destroyed’ her, she was intensely traumatized, and she was ‘terrified’ for her safety,” Justice Wainer Apter wrote. “The family court found her testimony credible. Based on that testimony, the court held plaintiff had demonstrated a ‘possibility of future risk’ to her ‘safety or well-being.’”
In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the standard for granting a SASPA protective order differs depending on whether the applicant seeks a temporary or final order. Importantly, an FPO does not require a showing that it is “necessary to protect the safety and well-being” of the victim like a TPO does; rather, an FPO requires only the “possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to find that the text of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16(a)(2), requiring a court to consider “the possibility of future risk to the safety or well-being of the alleged victim,” creates a “permissive standard that is easily satisfied.” Relying on the ordinary definitions of the terms used in the statute, the Court found its plain language requires a court to consider whether there is a chance that a survivor may be exposed to physical danger, risk, or injury, or may be exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make the survivor feel uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy.
“The plain language of factor two thus requires a court to consider whether there is a chance that a survivor may be exposed to physical danger, risk, or injury, or may be exposed to something emotionally unwelcome or unpleasant that could make them feel uncomfortable, unhealthy, or unhappy,” Justice Wainer Apter wrote. “And because the language of factor two is centered on the safety or well-being of the victim-survivor, a survivor’s own testimony regarding possible future risks to their safety or emotional well-being can suffice.”
According to the Court, its interpretation of the plain text of factor two as creating a lenient and easy-to-satisfy standard is reinforced by context: the “possibility of future risk” required for a SASPA FPO is less demanding than the “necessary” protection required for a SASPA TPO or the “immediate danger” required for a PDVA FRO.
In applying that standard, the New Jersey Supreme Court deferred to the trial court’s factual findings because they were supported by substantial evidence. It further found no error in the court’s legal conclusion.