In D.T. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia (A-35-23/088966) (Decided February 4, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that New Jersey courts can’t exercise personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese of Philadelphia based on alleged sexual abuse by a priest assigned by the Archdiocese to a Pennsylvania parish, during an overnight trip to a private home in New Jersey. According to the state’s highest court, the Archdiocese’s exercise of supervisory authority over the priest did not rise to the minimum contacts between the Archdiocese and New Jersey that would be necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction under Fourteenth Amendment due process principles.
Facts of D.T. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia
Plaintiff D.T. alleges that Michael McCarthy, a former Catholic priest, sexually abused him in New Jersey in 1971. At that time, plaintiff was fourteen years old, and McCarthy was serving as a priest and teacher in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia (the Archdiocese). As detailed in court documents, McCarthy invited plaintiff to go with him to a home McCarthy used in Margate, New Jersey. The Plaintiff’s mother gave permission, and McCarthy and the Plaintiff then drove to the Margate home. When they arrived, the Plaintiff alleges that McCarthy showed him pornography, encouraged him to drink alcohol, and sexually assaulted him.
In May 2019, the Legislature enacted the New Jersey Child Victims Act, which, for a two-year period, reopened the statute of limitations for certain time-barred civil claims arising from sexual offenses committed against minors. In May 2020, D.T. filed this action against the Archdiocese and McCarthy.D.T. alleged that defendants negligently provided pastoral services to him when McCarthy sexually abused him in New Jersey. D.T. also contended that the Archdiocese was vicariously liable for McCarthy’s tortious acts and that the Archdiocese was negligent in hiring and supervising McCarthy.
Pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(b), the Archdiocese moved to dismiss D.T.’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the Archdiocese’s motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding no basis for personal jurisdiction. It held that “McCarthy was not acting within the scope of his responsibilities as a priest when he sexually assaulted” D.T.
NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in D.T. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the Archdiocese did not establish the required contact with New Jersey to allow D.T.’s claims. “D.T. has not demonstrated that the Archdiocese’s exercise of supervisory authority over McCarthy gave rise to minimum contacts between the Archdiocese and New Jersey that relate to this action,” Justice Anne Patterson wrote.
In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment due process principles, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if there was “some act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities” in the forum state, “thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), the New Jersey Supreme Court further noted that the plaintiff’s claims must also “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum” state. If the court concludes that there are sufficient contacts, it must also find that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” in order to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant in accordance with Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Applying these jurisdictional principles, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that New Jersey may not exercise specific jurisdiction over the Archdiocese unless the Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in New Jersey, and the claims at issue arose from or related to the Archdiocese’s contacts with New Jersey. It went on to conclude that Archdiocese’s oversight of McCarthy’s work as a priest did not give rise to the necessary nexus with New Jersey. As Justice Patterson explained:
If D.T.’s allegations are true, it was McCarthy, not the Archdiocese, who initiated and maintained contacts with New Jersey that are relevant to this case. It was McCarthy, not the Archdiocese, who either owned or had access to the private home in Margate where the sexual abuse allegedly occurred. It was McCarthy, not the Archdiocese, who sought and obtained the permission of D.T.’s mother to take him on an overnight trip. And it was McCarthy, not the Archdiocese, who allegedly drove D.T. to Margate where he sexually assaulted the boy. There is no evidence that any Archdiocese representative was aware of McCarthy’s impending trip, let alone that it assigned McCarthy to take D.T. to New Jersey. There is no evidence that McCarthy conducted business on behalf of the Archdiocese in New Jersey, or that the trip entailed any religious or ecclesiastical activities.
Based on the above, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that D.T. had not demonstrated that the Archdiocese’s exercise of supervisory authority over McCarthy gave rise to minimum contacts between the Archdiocese and New Jersey that relate to this action. Accordingly, it affirmed the dismissal of his claims.