In State v. F.E.D. (A-12-21/086187) (Decided August 3, 2022), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the State’s Compassionate Release Statute does not require that an inmate prove that he is unable to perform any activity of basic daily living in order to establish a “permanent physical incapacity” under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). Rather, the statute requires clear and convincing evidence that the inmate’s condition renders him permanently unable to perform two or more activities of basic daily living, necessitating twenty-four-hour care.
Facts of State v. F.E.D.
The case involves the New Jersey Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the Compassionate Release Statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e, which authorizes a court to order the release of an inmate not otherwise eligible for parole based on his medical condition. To meet the statutory standard, the inmate must present clear and convincing evidence that he suffers from either “a terminal condition, disease, or syndrome, or a permanent physical incapacity.”
As the court explains in its opinion, to be deemed to have a “permanent physical incapacity” for purposes of the statute, an inmate must demonstrate that he has a medical condition which he did not have at the time of sentencing that renders him “permanently unable to perform activities of basic daily living” and that “results in the inmate requiring 24-hour care.” If an inmate proves that he has a “terminal condition, disease, or syndrome” or a “permanent physical incapacity,” he must then present clear and convincing evidence that his condition renders him “permanently physically incapable of committing a crime.” An inmate who seeks compassionate release based on a “permanent physical incapacity” rather than a “terminal condition, disease or syndrome” must also present clear and convincing evidence that the conditions under which he “would be released would not pose a threat to public safety.”
Petitioner F.E.D., convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, is serving two terms of life in prison and will not be eligible for parole until 2040. Diagnosed with cardiomyopathy and related conditions, he obtained a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release from the Department of Corrections pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(2). He filed a petition for compassionate release, in which he contended that he suffered from a “terminal condition, disease or syndrome” and a “permanent physical incapacity.”
The trial court observed that the attesting physicians had found a diminished ability in instrumental activities of daily living but not an inability to perform activities of basic daily living. The court accordingly found that F.E.D. had not presented clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a “permanent physical incapacity” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(1). The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that the Certificate of Eligibility for compassionate release that the Department issued to F.E.D. was invalid based on its view that the Compassionate Release Statute applies only to inmates whose medical conditions render them unable to perform any of the activities of basic daily living, and to be inapplicable to any inmate who can conduct one or more of those activities.
NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in State v. F.E.D.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. However, it did not agree with the Appellate Division’s interpretation of the Compassionate Release Statute to require that an inmate must prove that he is unable to perform any activity of basic daily living in order to establish a “permanent physical incapacity” under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l).
Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an inmate has demonstrated a “permanent physical incapacity” for purposes of the Compassionate Release Statute if he proves by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he has a medical condition that did not exist at the time of sentencing; (2) that medical condition renders him permanently unable to perform two or more activities of basic daily living; and (3) as a result of the inmate’s inability to perform those activities, he requires twenty-four-hour care.
The New Jersey Supreme Court first construed the term “activities of basic daily living” as it appears in the statute. It agreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the term “activities of basic daily living” in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l) includes eating, mobility, bathing, dressing, using a toilet, and transfers, and excludes instrumental activities such as shopping, house cleaning, food preparation, and laundry.
The New Jersey Court next considered the number of “activities of basic daily living” that the inmate must prove he is incapable of performing by virtue of his medical condition in order to be deemed to have a “permanent physical incapacity.” The court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s view that if an inmate can perform even one of the enumerated activities of basic daily living, he is unable to meet the statutory standard.
“Nothing in the Compassionate Release Statute suggests the Legislature’s intent that the inmate demonstrate that he is unable to perform any of the activities of basic daily living,” the court wrote. “Indeed, if the statute demanded a showing that, by virtue of the inmate’s medical condition, he is incapable of eating, walking, bathing, dressing, using a toilet, and getting in and out of bed, compassionate release would be granted rarely, if at all.”
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(1)’s “permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released” and “would not pose a threat to public safety” requirements. It determined that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(1) does not require an inmate to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is so debilitated or incapacitated that he is permanently physically incapable of committing any criminal offense. Rather, courts should determine whether that inmate is physically incapable, alone or with the assistance of another, of committing either the same crime or crimes of which he was previously convicted, or crimes similar to those of which he was convicted. Based on the above, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that F.E.D. failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a “permanent physical incapacity” as defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4- 123.51(e)(l).