The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently ruled that the New Jersey Division of Property Management and Construction (Division) acted properly when it awarded a contract for the lease of office space to the lowest bidder. The state’s highest court also concluded that the Director of the Division correctly determined that that an advertised requirement that the site location be within one-quarter mile of public transportation could be waived because it was not mandated by statute or regulation.

The Facts of the Case

The legal dispute in Barrick v. New Jersey involved a request for proposals (RFP) seeking bids from property owners in Morris County for the ten-year lease of office space to be used by the Department of Labor (DOL) as a one-stop career center. A detailed scope of work  set forth several requirements for the prospective location, including that “[t]he office shall be located within 1/4 mile of a mode of accessible public transportation (bus route or other means).” After no bid submitted by a qualified bidder satisfied the original distance requirement, the Director, in consultation with the DOL, determined it could be waived, given that the requirement was not compelled by law.

After the Director awarded the bid to RMD Properties, LLC (RMD), Matthew J. Barrick, Jr., the second lowest bidder, appealed the Director’s decision, but did not  seek a stay of the award . The Appellate Division held that the waiver of the advertised distance requirement was improper and that the monetary difference between RMD’s and Barrick’s bids was insignificant. It subsequently reversed the Director’s award of the lease, and remanded the matter to the Division to award the lease to Barrick or to rebid the project. The Division appealed.

The Court’s Decision

The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision. While the panel confirmed that material requirements to an RFP may not be waived, it found that “the Director’s determination that the distance requirement was not material to the RFP was unassailably reasonable and the decision awarding the lease contract to RMD was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.”

In reaching its decision, the court highlighted that the Director properly determined that the distance-to-public-transportation requirement was not mandated by statute or regulation. Moreover, the court found that the Director’s determination that cost-effectiveness was the factor of paramount importance and his subsequent award to the lowest bidder was entitled to deference.

Because the court ruled in favor of RMD, it declined to address the parties’ arguments for a bright-line rule in favor of mootness when an unsuccessful bidder fails to seek a stay when appealing a bid award. However, Justice LaVecchia warned that litigants who fail to pursue stay applications in bidding disputes do so at their own peril.  She wrote: “[w]e caution against any expectation that a merits review will be readily available to such unsuccessful bidders who sit on their right to seek a stay and hope for a remedy down the road.”

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group. 

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently addressed what happens when the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and attorney-client privilege intersect. In O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, the state’s highest court specifically addressed the application of the common interest rule to litigation documents requested under OPRA and the common law right to access government records. 

The Facts of the Case

Plaintiff Martin E. O’Boyle sought to compel defendants Borough of Longport (Longport) and Longport’s Clerk and Custodian of Records, Thomas Hiltner, to produce certain letters and compact discs (CDs) pursuant to OPRA and the common law right of access. The items requested consisted of litigation materials and correspondence exchanged between Longport’s municipal attorney and David Sufrin, private counsel for a former Planning and Zoning Board member and other persons who were involved in lawsuits with O’Boyle.

Longport provided some of the items requested, but refused to supply correspondence exchanged between the attorneys, of which several letters were expressly captioned “Confidential: Joint-Defense Strategy Memorandum-Attorney Joint Defense Work Product not for Disclosure to Third Parties.” O’Boyle subsequently filed suit.

The trial court ruled that the documents were not subject to production under OPRA, and the Appellate Division affirmed. It held that “the requested materials advanced a common interest, i.e., the defense of litigation spanning several years initiated by plaintiff related to his ongoing conflicts with Longport and individuals associated with the municipality. Thus the letters and CDs are protected by the work product privilege, an exception to OPRA.”

The Court’s Decision

The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed. “Because Longport and its officials, and Sufrin and his clients share a common interest, we conclude that the letters and CDs in this case, prepared in the process of developing a litigation defense strategy against one individual, are items protected by the work product privilege,” the court held.

In reaching its decision, the court expressly adopted the common interest rule as articulated in LaPorta v. Gloucester County Board of Chosen Freeholders, 340 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 2001). “The common-interest exception to waiver of confidential attorney-client communications or work product due to disclosure to third parties applies to communications between attorneys for different parties if the disclosure is made due to actual or anticipated litigation for the purpose of furthering a common interest,” the court stated.

With regard to OPRA, the court highlighted that the attorney-client privilege may shield documents that otherwise meet the statutory definition of government record from inspection or production. “The privilege also extends to consultation with third parties whose presence and advice are necessary to the legal representation,” the court concluded.

The much-anticipated decision is good news, as it ensures that municipal and private attorneys will be able to share information and work together without fear that doing so destroys attorney-client privilege

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group. 

New Jersey municipalities should be aware of an important U.S. Supreme Court decision addressing the expanded free speech rights of public employees. In Lane v. Franks, a unanimous Court held that the First Amendment protected a public employee when he testified truthfully about fraud in the work place pursuant to a subpoena. However, as the law was not settled at the time, the supervisor who terminated Lane’s employment was protected by qualified immunity from suit.

The Facts of the Case

The plaintiff in the case, Edward Lane, served as the Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a youth program run by Central Alabama Community College (CACC). In performing an audit of the program, Lane found that Alabama State Representative Suzanne Schmitz was on CITY’s payroll, although she did not report to work. Lane subsequently terminated Schmitz’s employment, despite warnings that doing so could have negative repercussions.   Schmitz’s firing triggered a federal fraud investigation. Lane testified, under subpoena, at Schmitz’s trial, and she was ultimately convicted.

Not long after his testimony, Lane was terminated by CACC as part of widespread layoffs, which were reportedly prompted by budget troubles. However, CACC’s president, Steve Franks, rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those of Lane and one other employee. Lane filed suit, naming Franks in his individual and official capacities under 42 U. S. C. §1983. Lane alleged that Franks fired him for providing the court testimony, in violation of his First Amendment rights.

First Amendment Protection

Under prior precedent regarding the First Amendment rights of public employees, a balancing test was employed, weighing “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). With regard to the content of the speech the Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421 (2006) that if the speech is made pursuant to the employee’s ordinary job duties, then the employee is not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.

In Lane , the Court expanded the understanding of when a public employee’s speech was outside the scope of the employee’s job duties – and thus subject to First Amendment protection as a citizen. As explained by the Court, “Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of citizen speech for the simple reason that anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth. That obligation is distinct and independent from any separate obligations a testifying public employee might have to his employer.”

The Court reasoned that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Garcetti far too broadly in holding that Lane did not speak as a citizen when he testified simply because he learned of the subject matter of that testimony in the course of his employment. According to the Court, “Garcetti said nothing about speech that relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course of that employment. The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”

Qualified Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983

Although finding that Lane’s speech was protected by the First Amendment issue, the Court concluded that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity for the claims against him in his individual capacity because the law was unsettled at the time he acted. As noted by the Court, relevant Eleventh Circuit precedent did not preclude Franks from reasonably believing that a government employer could fire an employee because of testimony the employee gave, under oath and outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities. This particular question has now been settled.

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group. You can also check out a companion post on the Lane v. Franks decision on The Constitution Law Reporter.

New Jersey municipalities should be aware of a key privacy decision issued by the U.S. Supreme Court late last month. The Court held that police officers must obtain a search warrant prior to reviewing a suspect’s cell phone, even if the search is incident to an arrest.

In the digital age, cell phones can provide a wealth of information to law enforcement. As the justices noted, “Many of the more than 90% of American adults who own cell phones keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives.” Nonetheless, any search of a suspect must comply with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which ensures the “right of the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures…” .

In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court addressed if cell phones searches should fall under Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement or the exception for searches incident to arrest. Under existing precedent, namely U.S. v. Robinson, police officers can conduct searches of an individual, incident to arrest, when it is necessary to protect officer safety and/or prevent evidence destruction.

Ultimately, the Court declined to extend Robinson to cell phone searches. The majority concluded that police may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. The Court treated cell phones like briefcases, requiring a warrant before they can be searched.

As explained by Chief Justice John Roberts,

Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life,” Boyd, supra, at 630. The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple — get a warrant.

In so ruling, the Court did leave room for police flexibility, noting that officers would still be permitted to search a cell phone under the “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. By way of example, Chief Roberts explained that a warrantless search would be proper where a subject is “texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the child’s location on his cell phone.”

For a more in-depth discussion of the Riley decision, please visit the Scarinci Hollenbeck Constitutional Law Reporter (http://scarinciattorney.com).

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group. 

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued a precedential wage and hour decision that will impact how New Jersey municipalities pay their police and fire personnel.

In Rosano v. Township of Teaneck, the court held that the municipality properly applied the Sec. 207(k) partial overtime exemption under the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA), which allows public entities to establish a “work period” of anywhere from seven to 28 days for employees engaged in law enforcement or fire protection activities.

The Facts of the Case

Eighty-eight current and former police officers employed by the Township of Teaneck (Teaneck) filed suit alleging that Teaneck violated the FLSA by failing to: (1) pay proper overtime; (2) provide compensation for time spent attending daily roll calls (muster time); and (3) provide compensation for time spent putting on (donning) and taking off (doffing) uniforms and equipment each day.

Under the applicable collective bargaining agreement (CBA), police officers work established and regularly recurring work periods of either seven or nine days, which combine so that police officers are required to work an average of 39.25 hours per week over the course of a calendar year. If an officer performs work in excess of his or her normal hours in any tour of duty, that work is considered overtime. The CBA provides for the accrual of overtime pay in blocks based on the amount of time worked after a regular tour. For example, if an officer works less than 31 minutes past his scheduled tour, he receives no overtime; if the officer works between 31 minutes and 44 minutes past his scheduled tour, he receives 30 minutes of overtime, etc.

The CBA also provides for inspection and roll call, or “muster time,” which takes place ten minutes prior to the start of officers’ shifts as well as ten minutes after. The effect of muster time is that for each eight-hour tour, officers may work for eight hours and twenty minutes. On any given day, officers may work less than the eight hours and twenty minutes depending on the length of the post-tour muster period. In those instances, officers are still given credit for the full eight hours and twenty minutes.

The Court’s Decision

The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court decision, which held in favor of the New Jersey municipality on all claims.

FLSA Exemption

The Third Circuit rejected the argument that Teaneck failed to properly adopt the Sec. 207(k) exemption by not making its intent to rely on it known. The court noted that the FLSA defines work period “as any established and regularly recurring period of work.” It does not require employers to “express an intent to qualify for or operate under the exemption. Employers must only meet the factual criteria set forth” in the statute.

Muster Time

The Third Circuit concluded that the only “reasonable interpretation” of the CBA provisions regarding muster time was that such time was built into the salaries of the officers. Accordingly, the officers’ daily work schedule is 8 hours and 20 minutes. “Such a reading would therefore encompass the tour of duty, the assignment, and pre- and post-tour muster time,” the court explained.

Donning and Doffing Time

The Third Circuit concluded that the officers’ donning and doffing time was not compensable under the FLSA. It noted that the CBA did not address the time officers spent donning or doffing their uniforms and gear. Moreover, the union never addressed the issue during contract negotiation. “Those facts certainly establish a longstanding acquiescence on the part of the officers and the unions to a ‘custom or practice’ of non-compensability of change time,” the appellate court concluded.

The court further held that the items officers were required to take on and off were primarily “clothes,” which are excluded under the FLSA in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group. 

Earlier this month the Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”) issued a new set of draft regulations in response to a recent ruling from the New Jersey State Supreme Court to replace, albeit for the third time, what had been commonly referred to as the “Third Round” regulations.  The issuance of these draft rules met the May 1^st deadline ordered by the New Jersey State Supreme Court.  The substantive rules that had been issued are comprised of three sections:  1.) a rehabilitation component; 2.) a “fair share” or prospective need component; and 3.) an unanswered prior round component.  The unanswered prior rounds deal with those municipalities who COAH believes did not meet their affordable housing obligations in what were known as the First and Second Round rules covering the time period prior to 1999.  The prospective need component is drawn from a methodology previously used by COAH and found acceptable by the courts under the First and Second Round rules, covering the time period from 1987 through 1999.  The prospective need component in the new set of draft rules projects a need for housing from 2014 through 2024 based upon State projections of growth.  These projections are tempered by factors such as “filtering” where households in the marketplace become available for people in low and moderate income brackets.  The methodology for municipal compliance is to again zone for inclusionary development, but at a lower formula in terms of the percentage of affordable set aside units compared to prior rules.  The set aside is now set at 10%, whereas in prior iterations of these rules the set aside was based on growth share or on a 20% set aside basis.

The proposed regulations will be published in the June 2, 2014, New Jersey Register, starting a sixty day comment period.  A public hearing on the draft regulations will be held on July 2, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., at the offices of the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency, 637 South Clinton Avenue in Trenton.  Following the comment period the regulations are to be issued in final form, with a State Supreme Court mandated deadline of November 17, 2014.  There is the real likelihood that litigation will again ensue from those who do not believe that the rules go far enough to provide for affordable housing, as well as from those who believe that these rules, even with their significant differences and the eradication of the “growth share” approach, are still too onerous to meet.

For more information about COAH or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group.

Last week, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court ordered the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) to sit down and get to work. The agency had requested an extension of time to promulgate new fair housing regulations, as required by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in its decision last September

In response to the Appellate Division’s order, COAH asked the Supreme Court of New Jersey to issue a stay while the high court considers COAH’s pending motion to extend the deadlines for completing the latest version of its Third Round rules. On March 10, 2014, the court agreed to enter a stay.  The meeting of COAH scheduled for March 12, 2014 was cancelled.

As we have previously discussed on this Government & Law Blog, the New Jersey State Supreme Court rejected the latest iteration of COAH’s “third round” regulations, which proposed a “growth share” methodology for assessing prospective need in allocating a municipality’s fair share of the region’s need for affordable housing. It set a deadline of February 26, 2014 for COAH to issue new regulations in compliance with the Fair Housing Act.

In a motion filed with the State Supreme Court in February, COAH acknowledged that it would not meet the deadline and requested additional time. Even prior to the delays, the Fair Share Housing Center requested that the Appellate Division designate a court-appointed monitor to take over COAH’s duties and carry out the Supreme Court order. It argued that COAH had not yet met since the September 2013 decision, despite the fact that the State Supreme Court ordered that new rules must be drafted, published for public comment, and then adopted by COAH by February 26, 2014.

In its decision, issued March 7, 2014, the Appellate Division declined to order what it characterized as the “extraordinary relief” of appointing a special master to oversee the process of issuing new regulations. However, it did establish a very specific timeline during which COAH must issue new regulations, after finding that the agency not only failed to carry out the state Supreme Court’s mandate, but also failed to offer any plausible explanation.

The order required COAH to meet by March 12, draft new rules and post them for public comment by March 21, meet on March 26 to review and adopt the rules, meet on May 14 to consider any amendments and adopt the rules.  This timetable is now in a state of flux as a result of the stay issued by the State Supreme Court.

We will be closely monitoring the ongoing litigation and will provide updates as they become available.

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group.

In Advance Housing v. Teaneck, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the tax-exempt status of two non-profit institutions that provide supportive housing and services. In doing so, the court rejected the arguments of several New Jersey municipalities that there was not a sufficient nexus between the housing and support services provided by the entities to justify the tax exemption.

The Facts of the Case

Plaintiff Advance Housing is a non-profit corporation that provides affordable, supportive housing and services for people with severe and persistent psychiatric disabilities. Plaintiff Advance 2000 was created as a subsidiary to acquire and own properties in compliance with the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) requirements concerning the acquisition of housing. Both entities are exempt from federal taxation as charitable institutions.

Because HUD also provides funding for those who require supportive housing but do not require additional services, it mandates that residents cannot be required to accept any supportive service as a condition of occupancy. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ leases do not mandate that the client actually participate in counseling services. However, the plaintiffs testified that all of the tenants do indeed receive services from Advance Housing.

The plaintiffs claimed property tax exemption under four sections of N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6: (a) provisions related to those who are “feebleminded,” “idiotic,” or “mentally retarded”; (b) provisions relating to the moral and mental improvement of men, women, and children; (c) the provision related to hospital purposes; and (d) the provision exempting properties that are actually and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

When nine municipalities refused to exempt the properties owned by Advance Housing and Advance 2000 from taxation under the statute, they filed tax appeals with the Bergen County Board of Taxation. While the Tax Court concluded that there was an insufficient nexus between the housing provided and the services offered by Advance Housing to justify a charitable property tax exemption, the Appellate Division reversed.

On appeal, the issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff’s residences for individuals with psychiatric disabilities are actually used for charitable purposes consonant with N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, entitling the property to tax-exempt status. 

The Court’s Decision

The state Supreme Court ultimately held that Advance Housing was entitled to tax-exempt status under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6. In arriving at its decision, the panel applied a test set forth out in Presbyterian Homes of Synod of NJ v. Division of Tax Appeals. 55 N.J. 275 (N.J. 1970). The three-part test requires the taxpayer seeking the charitable exemption to show that: 1) it is organized exclusively for a charitable purpose; 2) its property is actually being used for a charitable purpose; and 3) its use and operation of the property is not for profit.

In this case, the court concluded that the record fully supports plaintiffs’ assertion that all of the residents are “actually” receiving services. It further noted that these services relieve the government of the burden of providing more costly housing and care for those with psychiatric disabilities, such as institutionalization, group homes, hospitalization, and, potentially, incarceration.

Accordingly, “the integrated charitable program provided by the plaintiffs to those who live in the properties involved in this appeal is of the type the Legislature sought to benefit through the general ‘charitable’ property tax exemption contained in N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6,” the court stated.

For more information about this legislation or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group. 

The Supreme Court of New Jersey recently upheld the New Jersey Commissioner of Education’s (Commissioner) decision to deny Quest Academy’s application to open a charter school in Montclair. The court ruled that “the Commissioner’s decision to deny Quest Academy’s charter school application was amply supported by the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.”

The Facts of the Case

On October 15, 2010, Tracey Williams, on behalf of a group of founders, submitted an application to the Commissioner to open Quest Academy, a proposed charter high school in Montclair. The application was subsequently resubmitted and denied several times. Among the reasons for the denial, the Commissioner cited the ineffectiveness of standalone charter schools, the ability to attract enough students, the existing desegregation order that applies to the Montclair public schools, and community opposition.

In the lawsuit that followed, the Appellate Division affirmed the Commissioner’s denial. It found that the Commissioner’s denial of Quest Academy’s application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

The Court’s Decision

The state’s highest court ultimately sided with the Commissioner in IMO Proposed Quest Academy Charter School of Montclair Founders Group. “There is no right to operate a charter school,” the court held. “There is only the opportunity to apply for approval to operate if the application demonstrates proper merit.”

The court further concluded that the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard of review is applicable to the Commissioner’s decision to grant or deny a charter school application. In this case, the Commissioner’s decision to deny Quest Academy’s charter school application was amply supported by the record.

“Case law has recognized the value that administrative expertise can play in making predictive or judgmental determinations. The Commissioner’s decision demonstrates a thoughtful and thorough weighing and judgment of the merits of Quest Academy’s application and does not warrant judicial intervention,” the panel added.

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group.

As New Jersey communities continue to recover from Hurricane Sandy, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court has ruled that property owners may be entitled to compensation when protective sand dunes block their views of the ocean, when the property owners’ claims arise out of the municipality’s breach of an agreement to maintain that view. The case, Petrozzi v. Ocean City, did not involve an eminent domain taking.

The Facts of the Case

In 1989, Ocean City participated in a beach replenishment and dunes restoration program in conjunction with the state and federal government. The Army Corps of Engineers required that Ocean City obtain easements from all of the beachfront property owners impacted by the dune construction.

To ease property owners’ concerns over their beachfront views, Ocean City proposed easements containing a restriction that the municipality would construct and maintain the dune system with a height limitation of no greater than three feet above the average elevation of the bulkhead. The municipality subsequently secured the easements, and the dunes were constructed.

Between 1992 and 2000, natural forces caused areas the dunes to grow in height and width, and the affected property owners began requesting that Ocean City comply with the dune height limit provision in their easement agreements. However, amendments to the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) after the entry of the easements required the municipality to obtain the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s written authorization before commencing dune maintenance.

When DEP denied the permit, the homeowners filed suit alleging, among other things, that Ocean City breached its easement agreements by not maintaining the height limit on the dunes, causing the property owners to lose their view, access and privacy. The trial court ruled against most of the plaintiffs but found in favor of four plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims because their agreements were signed after the CAFRA amendments requiring DEP authorization took effect and therefore the City was aware of the difficulty of obtaining a permit to reduce dune height when the City agreed to limit that height in the easement agreements.  The court awarded damages to those four property owners.

The Court’s Decision

While the Appellate Division acknowledged that the statutory amendments and DEP’s subsequent disapproval of Ocean City’s permit application were beyond the municipality’s control and not reasonably foreseeable events, it still concluded that the property owners were entitled to compensation.

“If Ocean City may retain the benefit of this bargain despite its failure to perform its promise — even if performance was impracticable — without consequence, the municipality would reap a windfall at plaintiffs’ expense and plaintiffs would have given ‘something for nothing,’” the court explained.

Accordingly, the panel remanded the case back to the trial court to determine fair and just restitution. The court held that damages should follow the precedent established in Harvey Cedars v. Karan. As previously discussed on this blog, the New Jersey Supreme Court earlier this year held that compensation paid to property owners who have their views obscured by dunes must reflect the value of the lost view but also the benefit of the protection the dunes provide, namely storm protection.

For more information about this case or the legal issues involved, we encourage you to contact a member of Scarinci Hollenbeck’s Government Law Group.