Article I

Section 1 – Legislative powers; in whom vested.

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section 2 – House of Representatives, how and by whom chosen.

Qualifications of a Representative. Representatives and direct taxes, how apportioned. Enumeration. Vacancies to be filled. Power of choosing officers, and of impeachment.

1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the elector in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.
2. No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
3. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. (The previous sentence was superseded by Amendment XIV). The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
4. When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.
5. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment.

Section 3 – Senators, how and by whom chosen. How classified.

State Executive, when to make temporary appointments, in case, etc. Qualifications of a Senator. President of the Senate, his right to vote. President pro tern., and other officers of the Senate, how chosen. Power to try impeachments. When President is tried, Chief Justice to preside. Sentence.

1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, (chosen by the Legislature thereof,) (The preceding five words were superseded by Amendment XVII) for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.
2. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such 290 vacancies. (The words in italics were superseded by Amendment XVII)
3. No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.
5. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of the President of the United States.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.
7. Judgement in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgement and punishment, according to law.

Section 4 – Times, etc., of holding elections, how prescribed. One session in each year.

1. The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.
2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, (The words in italics were superseded by Amendment XX) unless they by law appoint a different day.

Section 5 – Membership, Quorum, Adjournments, Rules, Power to punish or expel. Journal. Time of adjournments, how limited, etc.

1. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each House may provide.
2. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish 291 David Brearley and the Making of the United States Constitution its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of twothirds, expel a member.
3. Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgement require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.
4. Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section 6 – Compensation, Privileges, Disqualification in certain cases.

1. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
2. No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.

Section 7 – House to originate all revenue bills. Veto.

Bill may be passed by two-thirds of each House, notwithstanding, etc. Bill, not returned in ten days to become a law. Provisions as to orders, concurrent
resolutions, etc.

1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the
3. bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.
4. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the president of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be re-passed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

Section 8 – Powers of Congress

The Congress shall have the power

1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States:
2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States:
3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes:
4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States:
5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures:
6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States:
7. To establish post-offices and post-roads:
8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries:
9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court:
10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations:
11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water:
12. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation o£ money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years:
13. To provide and maintain a navy:
14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces:
15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions:
16. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress:
17. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings: And,
18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Section 9 – Provision as to migration or importation of certain persons.

Habeas Corpus, Bills of attainder, etc. Taxes, how apportioned. No export duty. No commercial preference. Money, how drawn from Treasury, etc. No titular nobility. Officers not to receive presents, etc.

1. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importations, not exceeding 10 dollars for each person.
2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
3. No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.
4. No capitation, or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. (Modified by Amendement XVI)
5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.
6. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to, or from one state, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.
7. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.
8. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no person holding any office or profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

Section 10 – States prohibited from the exercise of certain powers.

1. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.
2. No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasuiy of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.
3. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in a war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

In Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township (A-40-24/089641) (Decided July 10, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that South Seaside Park can secede from Berkeley Township. According to the unanimous Court, the Berkeley Township Planning Board failed to independently evaluate the merits of a deannexation petition and make an objective recommendation to the municipality’s governing body. Additionally, the residents of South Seaside Park met the legal burden required for secession under state law.

Facts of Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township

On September 22, 2014, plaintiffs Donald Whiteman, Patricia A. Dolobacs, Judith A. Erdman, and 282 other residents of South Seaside Park, representing approximately sixty-six percent of the 435 registered voters in South Seaside Park, submitted to the Berkeley Township Council a petition “seeking annexation by Seaside Park Borough and deannexation from Berkeley Township.” In support, plaintiffs presented evidence that South Seaside Park residents rely more on Seaside Park than the Township for emergency services and engage more with the residents and businesses of Seaside Park than with the Township’s mainland community.

The Council referred the petition to the Planning Board. Beginning on January 15, 2015, and ending on February 7, 2019, the Planning Board conducted thirty-eight hearings. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12, the municipality’s planning board is charged to consider the evidence and “report to the governing body on the impact” that deannexation would have on the municipality. However, as explained in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion, the Planning Board retained a professional planner who did not remain impartial, but rather worked with the Township on its strategy for opposing deannexation and participated in the preparation of the Township’s witnesses for their testimony before the Board. 

During the hearings, plaintiffs presented the expert opinion of a professional planner, who testified that the Township had provided deficient services to South Seaside Park residents and had otherwise disregarded their needs. The planner opined that approval of the proposed deannexation would benefit the majority of South Seaside Park residents; that refusal to allow deannexation would be detrimental to the economic and social well-being of a majority of South Seaside Park residents; that deannexation would not cause a significant injury to the economic and social well-being of the Township; and that deannexation would not have a detrimental negative impact on the Township’s master plan, zone plan, affordable housing plan, or 2020 Vision Statement. Plaintiffs’ financial expert witness explained that the Township’s loss of taxes through deannexation would be offset, in part or in whole, by the Township’s savings on police services.

The Township’s expert witness on planning disputed the contention that the Township would suffer no harm if South Seaside Park were deannexed, and its Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer opined that deannexation would give rise to a tax increase of $147.63 for the average single-family home in the Township. In rebuttal, plaintiffs presented the testimony of a second professional planner, who testified that deannexation of South Seaside Park would not harm the Township, but that South Seaside Park’s residents would be harmed if deannexation were denied.

In August 2020, the Planning Board adopted a resolution recommending that the Township should deny the petition. By resolution dated September 21, 2020, the Township Council denied the petition, “relying on the well-supported findings” stated by the Planning Board in its resolution. Plaintiffs filed this action, seeking judicial review of the Council’s denial of their petition. 

The trial court found that plaintiffs had met their burden of proof with under N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1. It provides that, to challenge the denial of a petition, “the petitioners have the burden of establishing [1] that the refusal to consent to the petition was arbitrary or unreasonable, [2] that refusal to consent to the annexation is detrimental to the economic and social well-being of a majority of the residents of the affected land, and [3] that the annexation will not cause a significant injury to the well-being of the municipality in which the land is located.” The Appellate Division affirmed.

NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township

The New Jersey Supreme Court also affirmed. “We view N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12 to require a planning board to independently evaluate the merits of a deannexation petition and make an objective recommendation to the municipality’s governing body. That did not occur in this case,” Justice Anne Patterson wrote. “We agree with the trial court and Appellate Division that plaintiffs met their burden of proof with respect to all three prongs of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, and that the trial court properly ordered deannexation.”

In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed each of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1’s three prongs. With regard to the first prong, the Court agreed that Planning Board failed to conduct itself fairly and impartially. Justice Patterson explained:

As the trial court and Appellate Division found, the Board’s planner coordinated the litigation on the Township’s behalf, annotating transcripts, suggesting themes for the Township’s rebuttal of plaintiffs’ evidence, and helping Township witnesses prepare for their testimony. We concur with the Appellate Division that the planner’s conduct “was tantamount to a court-appointed expert participating in strategy sessions and witness preparation meetings for a party appearing before a court, thereby shaping the record that was developed and attempting to skew it in favor of one of the parties.” By virtue of that conduct, plaintiffs were denied a fair and impartial hearing on their petition.

The New Jersey Supreme Court also concurred with the trial court and Appellate Division that plaintiffs met their burden with respect to N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1’s second prong, relying heavily on the distance between South Seaside Park and the remainder of the land in the Township as well as the effort required for residents to traverse seven municipalities and reach the mainland, where virtually all municipal facilities are located. “We agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court’s findings on this issue are based on substantial evidence in the record, including fact and expert testimony on the social and economic detriment to South Seaside Park residents if they were denied the opportunity to annex their land to Seaside Park,” Justice Patterson wrote.

Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and the Appellate Division that plaintiffs proved that the proposed deannexation would not cause a significant injury to the Township’s well-being. In support, Justice Patterson noted that the evidence presented to the Board supports the conclusion that any economic loss to the Township would be offset to some degree by cost savings. It found that the record also supports the trial court’s finding that the deannexation of South Seaside Park would not cause significant social harm to the Township’s remaining residents, citing the limited contact between South Seaside Park residents and their counterparts in the Township’s mainland section.

Given that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of proof as to all three prongs of N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1, the Court ruled that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:7-13, plaintiffs may request that Seaside Park annex the land identified in plaintiffs’ petition for deannexation.

New Jersey History

Explore the Legacy That Shaped Justice and Governance in the Garden State

From the evolution of the state’s constitutions to the stories of influential justices and landmark appointments, delve into the foundational pillars that continue to shape New Jersey’s legal and political landscape.

Did You Know?

Constitutions

New Jersey adopted its first state constitution just four days after declaring independence from Britain in 1776.

Appointments

Arthur T. Vanderbilt secretly co-authored The Boss, a book designed to destroy the public image of Mayor Frank Hague, his greatest political rival.

Justices

The current NJ court rule system originated from a single legal dispute: Winberry v. Salisbury (1950).

Appointments

Frank Hague Jr. was nominated to New Jersey’s highest court despite never finishing law school.

Appointments

Frank Hague Jr. was nominated to New Jersey’s highest court despite never finishing law school.

Constitutions

NJ’s 1947 Constitution completely abolished 17 separate courts — creating one unified judicial system.

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In Kratovil v. City of New Brunswick (A-6-24/089427) (Decided June 17, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld Daniel’s Law, which prohibits the disclosure of the home addresses of certain public officials, including judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement personnel. 

In rejecting an as-applied challenge to Daniel’s Law by a journalist who sought to publish the Cape May home address of a New Brunswick public safety director, the Court found that while the address was a matter of public concern, the law was narrowly tailored to serve a state interest of the highest order.

Facts of Kratovil v. City of New Brunswick

In 2023, plaintiff Charles Kratovil learned through a records request pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) that the voting address of defendant Anthony Caputo, the New Brunswick Police Director, was in the Borough of Cape May. Kratovil, the editor of news outlet New Brunswick Today, began working on a story about Caputo’s residence, suggesting that Caputo lived too far from New Brunswick to effectively discharge his public duties. 

After Kratovil disclosed Caputo’s address to local officials, Caputo notified Kratovil that he was a covered person under Daniel’s Law, and requested that Kratovil refrain from republishing his exact home address. Daniel’s Law applies to the home address and unpublished home telephone number of a “covered person,” defined as “an active, formerly active, or retired judicial officer, law enforcement officer, or child protective investigator in the Division of Child Protection and Permanency, . . . or prosecutor, and any immediate family member residing in the same household” of such an official.

Kratovil filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and asserting that Daniel’s Law as applied to him violates the New Jersey Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The trial court rejected Kratovil’s as-applied challenge to Daniel’s Law and dismissed his complaint, concluding that Kratovil had the right to publish that Caputo lived in Cape May but not to publish Caputo’s precise home address. 

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that as applied to Kratovil, Daniel’s Law does not violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. It further concurred with the trial court that the statute supports a state interest of the highest order and that it is narrowly tailored to serve that state interest, given that Kratovil was free to state in his article that Caputo lived in Cape May without disclosing his exact address. 

NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in Kratovil v. City of New Brunswick

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. “As the parties agree and the trial court and Appellate Division determined, Daniel’s Law serves a state interest of the highest order: the protection of certain public officials and their immediate family members living in the same household so that those officials can perform their duties without fear of reprisal,” Justice Anne Patterson wrote. “We consider Daniel’s Law, as applied to prevent Kratovil’s proposed republication of Caputo’s exact home address, to be narrowly tailored to serve that state interest.”

In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the First Amendment principles stated in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 102-03 (1979), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989). Under the test established by the Supreme Court in those cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s first inquiry was whether Caputo’s home address is (1) truthful information that was (2) lawfully obtained and is (3) of public significance. It determined that the contested information — Caputo’s exact home address in Cape May — is related to Kratovil’s proposed story, and the subject matter of the story — a public official’s alleged failure to perform his duties because he lived hours from the community he served — is clearly a matter of public concern.

The New Jersey Supreme Court next addressed whether the challenged law “serves ‘a need to further a state interest of the highest order.’” In answering in the affirmative, it noted that all parties agree that Daniel’s Law serves a state interest of the highest order. Finally, the Court determined whether Daniel’s Law, as applied to Kratovil, is narrowly tailored to promote the state interest it was enacted to serve.

According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, as applied to Kratovil, “Daniel’s Law as written is narrowly tailored to achieve the state interest of the highest order: protection of certain public officials from harm and the threat of harm so that they can perform their public duties without fear of reprisal.” 

In support, the Court noted that the law is expressly limited to discrete categories of current and former public officials viewed by the Legislature to be at particular risk: judges, law enforcement officers, child protective investigators in the Division of Child Protection and Permanency, and prosecutors. 

Additionally, Daniel’s Law implicates only two categories of information: the covered person’s home address and the covered person’s unpublished home telephone number. 

As further evidence that the law is narrowly tailored, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that its strict notice requirement ensures that the statute is not a trap for the unwary; to the contrary, following receipt of the statutory notice, the recipient has an opportunity to identify the specific information subject to restrictions on disclosure and take steps to maintain the confidentiality of that information. 

Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that because Daniel’s Law complies with the First Amendment principles of Florida Star and Daily Mail, it also conforms to the freedom of speech and press guarantees, set forth in Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution, that Kratovil invoked in his appeal.

In Jersey City United Against the New Ward Map v. Jersey City Ward Commission (A-10/11-24) (089292) (Decided June 18, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected a challenge to a Jersey City ward map enacted in 2022. In a 4-3 decision, the Court found that the map was sufficiently “compact” under the Municipal Ward Law, and that the map did not violate the plaintiffs’ equal protection rights and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

Facts of the Case

Jersey City is divided into wards for the purpose of the election or appointment of any municipal officers. Following the release of the 2020 census data, the Ward Commission determined that there was a 59% population deviation between the most populous ward, Ward E, and the least populous ward, Ward D. That deviation far exceeded the maximum population deviation authorized by the Municipal Ward Law (MWL), N.J.S.A. 40:44-9 to -18. The Commission disseminated and later approved a new map in which the population deviation between those wards was 1.8% and the boundaries of all six wards were revised.

Plaintiffs, which included individuals and community organizations opposed to the Commission’s map, filed suits challenging the map. Plaintiffs argued that the new map failed to meet the MWL’s compactness requirement because its wards earned low scores on two mathematical measures of compactness, the Polsby-Popper Measure and the Reock Score. 

Second, the Community Organizations alleged that the Commission’s map violated principles of equal protection guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution, contending that the wards were not sufficiently compact and that the Commission unlawfully divided historic districts and established neighborhoods, thus diminishing the capacity of communities of interest to achieve effective representation for issues such as affordable housing and high-rise development. 

The Community Organizations also asserted a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), predicated upon the alleged violations of the MWL and the State Constitution.

The trial court concluded that the Commission’s ward map created wards that were sufficiently compact under the MWL and granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims. 

The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ MWL claims and remanded the matter to the trial court for factfinding as to whether there was a rational basis for the Commission’s determination that the wards defined by its map were sufficiently compact to satisfy the MWL’s requirements. It affirmed the trial court’s determinations of plaintiffs’ equal protection and NJCRA claims.

NJ Supreme Court’s Decision

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. “We view the Commission’s map to represent a proper exercise of the substantial discretion the MWL grants to ward commissions to set the boundaries of municipal wards. We do not concur with the Appellate Division’s ruling that additional factfinding is necessary to determine whether the Commission’s map meets N.J.S.A. 40:44-14’s compactness requirement,” Justice Patterson wrote. “Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division’s determination with respect to the MWL. We affirm the Appellate Division’s determination that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ equal protection and NJCRA claims.”

In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court first addressed the requirements of the MWL, which charges a commission to “fix and determine the ward boundaries so that each ward is formed of compact and contiguous territory.” The MWL further mandates that “[t]he population of the most populous ward so created shall not differ from the population of the least populous ward so created by more than [ten percent] of the mean population of the wards,” using the census as “the population determinant.” 

The Court emphasized that the New Jersey Legislature did not define a “compact” territory for purposes of the MWL, nor did it direct that ward commissions use a mathematical measure of compactness such as the Polsby-Popper Measure or the Reock Score in the determination of ward boundaries, even though they were available when the MWL was enacted.

“The Legislature directed a ward commission to design wards that are compact, but did not prescribe a methodology for that determination or otherwise constrain a ward commission’s discretion,” Justice Anne M. Patterson explained. “If a ward commission decides that such measures may assist it in a determination of ward boundaries, it may elect to use them, but it is not required to do so.”

The New Jersey Supreme Court further found that although the preservation of communities of interest may be relevant to the work of ward commissions, it is not a requirement for determining compactness under the MWL. “There is no authority in the MWL, its legislative history, or our case law for plaintiffs’ argument that when it required wards to be ‘compact,’ the Legislature mandated that the members of a community of interest must vote in the same ward,” Justice Patterson wrote. The Court similarly rejected plaintiffs’ contention that Wards A, D, and F are “bizarrely shaped” and thus violate the MWL. 

The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that it was possible to envision a ward map in which any of Jersey City’s wards would be more compact than they appear in the Commission’s redistricting plan. “Our inquiry, however, is not whether a court could design a better map than the map that the Commission devised,” Justice Patterson wrote, but instead to “eliminate the serious population deviation that had developed over the past decade.”

With regard to the Community Organizations’ equal protection claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division. “As the Appellate Division observed, the Community Organizations failed to allege that the Commission unconstitutionally treated one class of people differently from the manner in which it treated another class of people,” Justice Patterson wrote. “Instead, they contend that the Commission improperly divided certain established neighborhoods and communities of interest into wards that were not compact. Accordingly, our conclusion that the Commission complied with the MWL’s compactness standard compels rejection of the Community Organizations’ equal protection claim.”

Finally, the Court addressed the Community Organizations’ NJCRA claim. It found that because an NJCRA claim depends on a deprivation “of any substantive…rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State,” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c), and because the Court found that no constitutional or statutory violation occurred, the Appellate Division was correct in determining that the trial court properly dismissed the Community Organizations’ NJCRA claim.

In In Re Appeal of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection’s September 6, 2022 Denial of Request for Adjudicatory Hearing (A-42-23/089182) (Decided April 7, 2025), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Department of Environmental Protection’s (DEP) grant of a waiver suspending certain environmental remediation obligations does not create a constitutionally protected property interest in that waiver.

Facts of the Case

The Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) prohibits the owner of an industrial establishment from transferring ownership until certain conditions are met, unless the owner pursues one of the alternatives that ISRA provides. As relevant here, one of the listed exceptions, N.J.S.A. 13:1K-11.5, provides for an “[a]pplication for closing [or] transfer when remediation is already in progress.” Under that provision, an entity may apply to the DEP for a Remediation in Progress Waiver (RIP Waiver), which allows that entity to proceed with a triggering event (i.e., sale or cessation of operations) without the typical attendant ISRA requirements “if the industrial establishment is already in the process of a remediation.”  To receive a RIP Waiver, an entity must submit evidence “that the property…is being remediated by a prior owner or operator” and that a compliant “remediation funding source” (RFS) has been created. 

In 2006, the corporate predecessor of Clarios, LLC, purchased an industrial site (“the Site”), for which the seller had executed a remediation plan under ISRA and placed funds in trust for future remediation (“the RFS Trust”). In 2007, Clarios ceased operations, triggering its ISRA responsibilities. Clarios, therefore, sought a RIP Waiver. In March 2007, the DEP granted Clarios’s RIP Waiver but expressly reserved the right to enforce Clarios’s ISRA obligations in the future, informing Clarios that the DEP “continues to reserve all rights to pursue appropriate enforcement actions allowable under the law for violations of ISRA.”

In August 2011, Clarios sold the Site. In 2016, the purchaser of the Site filed for bankruptcy. In July 2021, the purchaser certified that the estimated cost to complete remediation was $563,000 but that the RFS Trust was fully depleted. The purchaser thereafter also missed its February 2022 deadline for completing remediation of the Site. In April 2022, the DEP rescinded Clarios’s RIP Waiver because remediation of the Site was no longer in progress, the RFS Trust was depleted, and the Site was out of compliance.

Clarios requested an adjudicatory hearing before the DEP, arguing that the DEP’s rescission of the RIP Waiver without notice or an opportunity to be heard violated its due process rights. The DEP denied the request, stating that rescission of a RIP Waiver does not entitle Clarios to request an adjudicatory hearing pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:26C-9.10(a) and that rescission does not constitute a contested case requiring a hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act. Clarios appealed that decision. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the DEP, holding that Clarios did not have a protected property interest in the RIP Waiver. 

NJ Supreme Court’s Decision

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. “We hold that the DEP’s initial grant of the waiver did not create a property interest in the continued suspension of Clarios’s remediation obligations,” Justice Hoffman wrote. “Neither the controlling statutes and regulations nor a mutually explicit understanding between the parties provided an entitlement to the indefinite continuance of the waiver; to the contrary, the governing laws and agency materials all anticipate the DEP’s ability to enforce remediation obligations in the future.” 

In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court first emphasized that the “chief ingredient” in a property interest protected by the due process clause is a legitimate claim of entitlement. It further noted that an express statutory or regulatory grant is the clearest and strongest proof of an entitlement, which may be shown through imitations placed on

agency decision-making with respect to an alleged benefit. The Court also acknowledged that an entitlement may be derived from mutually explicit understandings. However, for an “understanding” to give rise to a property interest, the party asserting an entitlement must establish that both parties mutually recognized the existence of an entitlement. Conversely, when an agency has broad discretion to grant, deny, or remove a purported benefit,

there is also not likely to be a mutually explicit understanding of an entitlement, the Court explained.

The New Jersey Supreme Court next addressed whether Clarios had an entitlement to the RIP Waiver. It first found no indication of an express statutory grant of entitlement in the indefinite continuation of the RIP Waiver at the time of rescission, noting that ISRA provides no guidance on how the DEP should exercise its discretion in enforcing remediation obligations once a property falls out of compliance. The Court also found no indication of such an entitlement in ISRA’s implementing regulations. “To the contrary, ISRA’s implementing regulations expressly state that the DEP retains discretionary authority to rescind a RIP Waiver,” Justice Hoffman wrote.

The New Jersey Supreme Court also found that Clarios also failed to demonstrate that an extra-statutory or extra-regulatory understanding existed that would support its claim of entitlement. “[W]hen site remediation is no longer in progress, the DEP’s discretion regarding RIP Waiver rescission is unfettered, countering any argument that a lack of discretion created a mutually explicit understanding that Clarios was entitled to the continuation of the RIP Waiver when the Site was no longer compliant with ISRA,” Justice Hoffman explained. The Court also rejected Clarios’ argument that the DEP’s silence during the fifteen years that the DEP did not enforce Clarios’s residual remediation obligations amounted to a mutual understanding. According to Justice Hoffman, any silence by the DEP did not rise to the level of a “mutually explicit” understanding.

Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that because Clarios had no protected property interest in the indefinite continuation of the RIP Waiver, rescission of the RIP Waiver without a hearing was not a deprivation of its due process rights.

In M.A. v. J.H.M. (A-1-24/089673) (Decided May 27, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a defendant in a Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA) final restraining order (FRO) hearing may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that raise reasonable risks of self-incrimination. The unanimous Court further held that no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of that right. 

Facts of M.A. v. J.H.M

Plaintiff, M.A., and defendant, J.H.M., were married in 2019 and have one son together. Plaintiff and her son moved out of the marital home in January 2023, and she initiated divorce proceedings in March 2023. In April 2023, police arrested defendant and charged him with various weapon offenses after he used a handgun to threaten the process server who was attempting to deliver divorce papers to him. Defendant’s weapons were seized and he was granted pre-trial release. In July 2023, plaintiff filed a civil complaint, pursuant to the PDVA, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO), alleging that defendant committed the predicate offenses of stalking and harassment. The court issued plaintiff a TRO prohibiting defendant from having any contact with her, granting her temporary custody of their son, and denying defendant parenting and visitation time until further notice.

The FRO hearing took place over several days, and plaintiff called defendant as a witness. Defense counsel invoked the privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of defendant, claiming defendant could rightfully refuse to provide any testimony. Over defense counsel’s objections, the trial court ordered defendant to take the stand, swear an oath, and undergo direct examination. Defendant gave his name when asked but invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to the next question — whether he was married to plaintiff. Counsel for plaintiff and defendant argued over whether the Fifth Amendment could properly be invoked and to what extent. Plaintiff’s counsel proffered that he intended to ask questions about driving by plaintiff’s house and calling her at work, the alleged acts on which plaintiff’s complaint was based. Defense counsel insisted that the Fifth Amendment protected defendant because he could still be charged with harassment and stalking at a later time, as the statute of limitations had not yet expired. The court ruled in favor of plaintiff but stayed the matter pending defendant’s decision to appeal.

The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. While defendant’s motion for leave to appeal was pending before the Court, the Appellate Division published T.B. v. I.W., 479 N.J. Super. 404 (App. Div. 2024), which addresses an issue substantially similar to the question presented in this case. There, the Appellate Division held that “a trial court may not draw an adverse inference in an FRO proceeding based solely upon defendant’s decision to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to not testify.”

NJ Supreme Court Decision in M.A. v. J.H.M

The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed. “We hold that although the Fifth Amendment does not afford a defendant in a PDVA FRO hearing blanket immunity, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self- incrimination in response to specific questions that raise reasonable risks of self-incrimination, and that no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of that right,” Justice Noriega wrote. “Further, we hold that the PDVA immunity provision contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination and is therefore insufficient to safeguard a defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment.”

In reaching its decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court largely agreed with the Appellate Division’s reasoning in T.B. v. I.W.  Most notably, it agreed that the PDVA’s limited immunity provision is not sufficient protection for a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights because it does not foreclose the possibility of future prosecution in actions related to the underlying predicate offenses or possible criminal actions beyond those related to the predicate offenses underlying the FRO hearing.

“The statutory immunity provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) does not satisfy the constitutional standard for immunity because it is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment,” Justice Noriega explained. “The immunity provision lacks derivative use protection by leaving open the possibility that law enforcement may build a criminal case using leads obtained from compelled testimony at the FRO hearing — precisely what the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination prohibits.”

The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to emphasize that its holding does not allow a defendant to invoke a blanket privilege as to all testimony in a PDVA hearing. Rather, the privilege must be asserted on a question-by-question basis, and the defendant must “ha[ve] reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer” according to the clear framework for evaluating the proper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege set forth in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). By way of example, the Court distinguished the question regarding defendant’s marital status from questions like “[d]id you place the phone call to my client on July 5,” which could potentially subject the defendant to criminal liability.

In State v. John T. Bragg (A-13-24/089446) (Decided May 6, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the jury should have been instructed on the castle doctrine and, therefore, any conviction involving self-defense must be vacated. Under New Jersey law, while individuals may use force against others to protect themselves, they may not use deadly force if they can retreat with complete safety. The castle doctrine provides an exception to the duty to retreat: a person “is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial aggressor.”

Facts of State v. Bragg

On the night of September 30, 2017, defendant John Bragg (the “Defendant”) drove Lorenza Fletcher, her cousin Daquan Anderson, and her three-year-old son to an apartment complex in Trenton, where he signed in with a security guard in the lobby of the complex. The State points to that as evidence defendant was a guest, not a tenant. 

The group then went to an apartment on the ninth floor. According to all three adults, the Defendant had a key to enter the apartment. Inside it was an air mattress, a television, pots and pans, and some alcohol. The Defendant testified that he had an informal sublease with the apartment’s tenant and had been staying there for “a few weeks” by the night in question.

At the apartment, a violent fight erupted. The police arrested the Defendant and took him into custody. A grand jury later returned a nineteen-count indictment charging defendant with various offenses, including those for which self-defense may be asserted as a defense.

Defendant, Fletcher, and Anderson all testified at trial. The Defendant claimed Fletcher and Anderson initiated the fight; they claimed the Defendant was the aggressor. As a result, self-defense was a focal point of the trial. The State repeatedly questioned the Defendant about his claim of self-defense and highlighted that the Defendant did not retreat from the apartment in cross-examination and summation. The trial judge conducted two conferences about the proposed jury charge. The charge did not include guidance on the exception to the duty to retreat. The jury found the Defendant guilty of twelve counts in the indictment and of two lesser-included offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence, finding  no plain error in the failure to instruct the jury on the exception to the duty to retreat. 

NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in State v. Bragg

The New Jersey Supreme Court found it was plain error not to instruct the jury on the castle doctrine. As a result, it vacated the counts of the Defendant’s conviction that involved the issue of self-defense.

“Whether defendant should have retreated was a critical part of certain offenses charged in this case. Jurors heard the State press the point at trial; they also heard conflicting accounts of who the ‘initial aggressor’ was and whether the apartment was defendant’s ‘dwelling,’” Chief Justice Stuart Rabner wrote. “But the jury received no direction as to how those disputed facts related to — or had the potential to negate — the duty to retreat in this case.”

The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to find that under the circumstances, the failure to give the jury guidance on the castle doctrine was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. It emphasized that each side accused the other of starting the fight, and each had injuries to support their claim, both of which were disputed factual issues for the jury to decide. However, the jury was not asked to resolve them or receive any guidance about the significance of either issue or the overall exception to the duty to retreat. “Without that information, the jury was clearly capable of finding that defendant was required to retreat rather than use deadly force,” the Chief Justice wrote. “Yet a proper instruction was just as capable of leading jurors to conclude defendant had no such obligation and could stand his ground and defend himself if he was attacked.” Accordingly, the Court found it was plain error not to instruct the jury on the issue.

Lastly, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the argument that any error here was invited because nothing in the record established that defense counsel induced or encouraged the erroneous instruction. Going forward, the Court advised that, to facilitate appellate review, trial judges mark for identification drafts of proposed jury charges discussed at charge conferences and retain them as part of the court file.

In State v. John T. Bragg (A-13-24/089446) (Decided May 6, 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the jury should have been instructed on the castle doctrine and, therefore, any conviction involving self-defense must be vacated. Under New Jersey law, while individuals may use force against others to protect themselves, they may not use deadly force if they can retreat with complete safety. The castle doctrine provides an exception to the duty to retreat: a person “is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial aggressor.”

Facts of State v. Bragg

On the night of September 30, 2017, defendant John Bragg (the “Defendant”) drove Lorenza Fletcher, her cousin Daquan Anderson, and her three-year-old son to an apartment complex in Trenton, where he signed in with a security guard in the lobby of the complex. The State points to that as evidence defendant was a guest, not a tenant. 

The group then went to an apartment on the ninth floor. According to all three adults, the Defendant had a key to enter the apartment. Inside it was an air mattress, a television, pots and pans, and some alcohol. The Defendant testified that he had an informal sublease with the apartment’s tenant and had been staying there for “a few weeks” by the night in question.

At the apartment, a violent fight erupted. The police arrested the Defendant and took him into custody. A grand jury later returned a nineteen-count indictment charging defendant with various offenses, including those for which self-defense may be asserted as a defense.

Defendant, Fletcher, and Anderson all testified at trial. The Defendant claimed Fletcher and Anderson initiated the fight; they claimed the Defendant was the aggressor. As a result, self-defense was a focal point of the trial. The State repeatedly questioned the Defendant about his claim of self-defense and highlighted that the Defendant did not retreat from the apartment in cross-examination and summation. The trial judge conducted two conferences about the proposed jury charge. The charge did not include guidance on the exception to the duty to retreat. The jury found the Defendant guilty of twelve counts in the indictment and of two lesser-included offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence, finding  no plain error in the failure to instruct the jury on the exception to the duty to retreat. 

NJ Supreme Court’s Decision in State v. Bragg

The New Jersey Supreme Court found it was plain error not to instruct the jury on the castle doctrine. As a result, it vacated the counts of the Defendant’s conviction that involved the issue of self-defense.

“Whether defendant should have retreated was a critical part of certain offenses charged in this case. Jurors heard the State press the point at trial; they also heard conflicting accounts of who the ‘initial aggressor’ was and whether the apartment was defendant’s ‘dwelling,’” Chief Justice Stuart Rabner wrote. “But the jury received no direction as to how those disputed facts related to — or had the potential to negate — the duty to retreat in this case.”

The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to find that under the circumstances, the failure to give the jury guidance on the castle doctrine was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. It emphasized that each side accused the other of starting the fight, and each had injuries to support their claim, both of which were disputed factual issues for the jury to decide. However, the jury was not asked to resolve them or receive any guidance about the significance of either issue or the overall exception to the duty to retreat. “Without that information, the jury was clearly capable of finding that defendant was required to retreat rather than use deadly force,” the Chief Justice wrote. “Yet a proper instruction was just as capable of leading jurors to conclude defendant had no such obligation and could stand his ground and defend himself if he was attacked.” Accordingly, the Court found it was plain error not to instruct the jury on the issue.

Lastly, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the argument that any error here was invited because nothing in the record established that defense counsel induced or encouraged the erroneous instruction. Going forward, the Court advised that, to facilitate appellate review, trial judges mark for identification drafts of proposed jury charges discussed at charge conferences and retain them as part of the court file.

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in In re the Matter Concerning the State Grand Jury (089571). The closely watched case centers on whether a grand jury has the authority to investigate the Catholic Church’s handling of sex abuse allegations.

Facts of the Case

In 2018, then-Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal announced the Clergy Abuse Task Force. The Task Force was created following the publication of a Pennsylvania grand jury report regarding sexual abuse committed by clergy, which included the disclosure of sexual abuse by clergy who had served in New Jersey.

The Attorney General charged the Task Force with investigating allegations of sexual abuse by clergy and efforts to conceal such abuse. The Task Force was empowered to subpoena documents and testimony, present information to a grand jury, and pursue indictments and a grand jury presentment as part of its mandate to address any wrongdoing uncovered.

The Diocese of Camden challenged the grand jury’s authority to issue any presentment on clergy sexual abuse. On May 25, 2023, the trial court issued its oral opinion, holding both that (1) it could lawfully consider the validity of a hypothetical presentment on sexual abuse by clergy and the response thereto, and (2) that the grand jury would lack authority to issue such a presentment. According to the court,  the grand jury lacks “authority to return a presentment which focuses … on misconduct by Catholic priests” under Rule 3:6-9(a), which states that presentments “may refer to public affairs or conditions.” 

The trial court further found that “private conduct” does not qualify, even where that conduct “is a matter of public concern.” It further held that “[t]he presentment promised here” would not “refer to public affairs [or] conditions” because “priests are not public officials and the Catholic Church is not a public entity.”

The Appellate Division affirmed “substantially for the reasons set forth by the trial court.”

Issues Before the NJ Supreme Court

The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on October 18, 2024. The justices agreed to consider the following question:

Does a State Grand Jury have the authority to return a presentment about sexual abuse by members of the clergy?

Oral arguments were held on April 28, 2025. The debate largely focused how a grand jury can be used and if it has the authority to investigate private entities like the diocese or only government officials or agencies. Michael L. Zuckerman, the state’s deputy solicitor general, argued that the lower courts short-circuited the legal process before it could even begin. 

“My frontline argument to you is that it is highly premature, inconsistent with the rule, for the trial court to have short-circuited this process before it could even start,” Zuckerman said. “And so for that reason, this court should simply reverse and remand for the process to go forward, possibly clarifying along the way that presentments can sometimes talk about non-governmental actors too.”

Attorney Lloyd D. Levenson, representing the Camden diocese, argued that clergy abuse was “long-ago conduct by private individuals that impacted only a fragment of the population.”

“If this court expands the scope of a grand jury presentment to include private individuals and private entities, conducting investigations in secret under the sole influence of a prosecutor with no opportunity to present a defense, the grand jury’s authority will be unlimited,” he added. “Presentments were never intended to call attention to private conduct within private entities. We ask, respectfully, that this court affirm.”

Several justices questioned if it was premature to act before a grand jury has issued a presentment. “It’s really difficult to speculate as to what a presentment — if 12 grand jurors even vote on a presentment — will look like, and trying to determine how to assess something that has not yet come into existence,” Justice Fabiana Pierre-Louis stated.

The New Jersey Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision within the coming months. Please check back for updates.